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Abstract
It is only in the last few decades that analytic philosophers in particular have begun to
pay any serious attention to the topic of life’s meaning. Such philosophers, however, do
not usually attempt to answer or analyse the traditional question ‘What is the meaning
of life?’, but rather the subtly different question ‘What makes a life meaningful?’ and it
is generally assumed that the latter can be discussed independently of the former.
Nevertheless, this paper will argue that the two questions are indeed connected, and that
identifying and expanding upon the most plausible analysis of the former will provide
the resources necessary to determine the most plausible answer to the latter. Specifi-
cally, this paper will argue that the traditional question is simply a request for the
information which constitutes a coherent answer to one or more of a certain set of
questions regarding human existence that were salient to the asker. In simpler language,
the meaning of life itself is the information a person needs to make sense of it. This
analysis can then also be applied to individual lives, such that asking for the meaning of
X’s life is an analogous request for the information necessary to make sense of that life
in particular. Running with this concept of the ‘meaning’ of something as its ‘sense’,
the paper then outlines an accompanying theory of ‘meaningfulness’ as ‘sensefulness’:
a measure of the richness of certain aspects of the life, multiplied by their intelligibility.
Keywords Meaning .Meaningfulness . Life . Sense . Coherence . Intelligibility
1 Introduction
The traditional question ‘What is the meaning of life?’ has often been seen as
philosophy’s central concern, at least by those outside of the profession.1 Despite this,
Philosophia
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-019-00063-x
1And perhaps a few within the profession too. See Tartaglia (2016) for one example.
* Joshua Lewis Thomas
joshlewisthomas@hotmail.co.uk; joshua.thomas@open.ac.uk
1 School of Politics, Philosophy, Economics, Development, Geography, The Open University,
Walton Hall, Milton Keynes MK7 6AA, UK
it is only in the last few decades that analytic philosophers in particular have begun to
pay any serious attention to the topic. Such philosophers, however, do not usually
attempt to answer or analyse the question above, but rather the subtly different question
‘What makes a life meaningful?’ where it is generally assumed that these subjects can
be tackled independently.2 Typically, the thought is that the former is asking a question
about the origins of all life or for some clue regarding the purpose or nature of existence
itself, whereas the latter is seen as asking a narrower question about a property which
individual lives may possess – specifically, a property which is seen as being valuable
or desirable and has something to do with, for instance, how much a life matters or
whether it is connected to some worthy goal.3
Nevertheless, this paper will argue that the two questions are indeed connected, as is
indicated by the similar terminology being used (i.e. ‘meaning’ and ‘meaningfulness’),
and that identifying and expanding upon the most plausible analysis to the former will
provide the resources necessary to determine the most plausible answer to the latter. In
other words, once we clear up what is meant by the traditional question ‘What is the
meaning of life?’, and the concept of ‘meaning’ in a more general sense, we will be able
to find our way to a straightforward and credible analysis of the concept of ‘meaning-
fulness’ and the criteria for its application to individual lives.
Specifically, sections 2 and 3 of this paper will argue, taking inspiration from Joshua
Seachris (2009), that the traditional question is simply a request for a coherent answer to
one or more of a certain set of questions regarding human life that were salient to the asker.
In simpler language, the meaning of life itself is the information a person needs to make
sense of it with regard to features such as its origin, purpose, and impact. This analysis can
then also be applied to individual lives, such that asking for the meaning of X’s life is an
analogous request for the information necessary to make sense of that life in particular.
Running with this concept of the ‘meaning’ of something as its ‘sense’, section 4 will then
outline an accompanying theory of ‘meaningfulness’ as ‘sensefulness’: a measure of the
richness of certain features of the life, multiplied by their intelligibility. Finally, section 5
will contain some concluding remarks and highlight the strengths of my overall account
relative to theories of meaningfulness found in the existing literature.
2 Meaning as Sense
My aim in this paper is to give an analysis of the concept of meaningfulness and the
question ‘What is the meaning of life?’ which is unified, congruent with our
everyday language use, and intuitively plausible. To show how this can be done, I
will first outline Seachris’ analysis of the traditional meaning of life question
(2009). Often, this question is seen as somehow very opaque or mysterious, and
not admitting of any straightforward answer or even interpretation. Nevertheless,
Seachris argues there does exist a very natural reading of this question. In essence,
his theory is this: when we ask, ‘What is the meaning of life?’ what we are really
2 See Tartaglia (2015) for a critique of this common practice. Philosophers who have departed from this trend
and attempted to discuss the more traditional question include Seachris (2009) and Cottingham (2003).
3 These two questions are sometimes referred to as the meaning of life question and the meaning in life
question (e.g. Schinkel et al. 2015, p.4). However, the in/of distinction can be interpreted in different ways, so I
will refrain from using it here.
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requesting is specifically Ba narrative that narrates across an existentially relevant
threshold of life phenomena and questions^ (p.18).
To explain, let’s imagine I walk into my office and, finding a stranger sitting in my
chair, I ask, BWhat is the meaning of this?^4 Now in such a case it seems that my
request is nothing mysterious; I am merely asking for Ban explanation as an interpretive
framework through which to view the event^ (p.13). This will involve me learning
certain facts, such as the causal path which led to the stranger’s presence, or their
intentions, and from these facts I will be able to develop a narrative through which I can
make sense of the event. Seachris claims that when we ask for the meaning of
something, we are simply asking for the story of it (p.13). To be clear though, what
the asker is ultimately after here is a way to make sense of the event, but Seachris
believes we typically accomplish this through the use of narratives (p.11).
Aside from the connection between narratives and sense-making,5 the important
conclusion to draw from Seachris’ analogy is that, when someone asks for the meaning
of life, we can interpret this request in precisely the same straightforward way as we do
in the case of the stranger: as asking for some explanation, potentially in narrative form,
that will render the event intelligible to us. The only difference is that what we want to
make sense of in this case is not the presence of a stranger in my office, but rather the
phenomenon of human existence itself. As Seachris explains, Bwe lack important parts
of the story... and we desire to fill the existentially relevant informational gaps in our
understanding of the universe we inhabit^ (p.13). This goes some way towards
explaining why we might expect the answer to the traditional question to take the
structure of a ‘pithy formula’, since all we might plausibly require are a few key facts to
complete the existential narrative we are trying to build in order to make sense of ‘life’.6
Granting all this, Seachris asserts that the meaning of life will simply be whatever
true narrative successfully narrates over Bthose areas of greatest existential import to
humans^ (p.13). Essentially, it would be a story about existence which truthfully
answers certain weighty questions we have about life. Seachris provides a list which
he claims ‘more or less composes’ this set of questions:
i. BWhy does anything or we or I exist at all?^
ii. BDoes life have any purpose(s), and if so, what is its nature and source?^
iii. BDoes the worth and value of (our) pursuits and projects need grounding in
something else, and if so, what?^
iv. BPain and suffering are part of the universe… Why?^
v. BHow does it all end? Is death final? Is there an eschatological remedy to the ills of
this world?^ (p.14)
I agree with the core of what Seachris claims here; his account has the power to unify
the diverse interpretations of the ‘meaning of life’ question into just one straightforward
request, thereby vindicating our complex intuitions about the nature of meaning. For
instance, to ask about the meaning of life can be to ask about the aims, origin, and
4 Seachris’ own example involves a father finding his sons fighting (2009, p.13).
5 Which is also noted by many other theorists, such as Strawson (2004, p.439), Velleman (2003, p.1), Vice
(2003, p.95), and Heyd and Miller (2010, p.23).
6 Bennett (1984, p.589) and Thomson (2003, p.5) each note the intuition that ‘the meaning of life’ could be
provided as some kind of ‘simple formula’.
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nature of life, all at once, without that request being confused. Moreover, his analysis
interprets the traditional question Bon its own linguistic terms^ (p.17) – asking about
the meaning of life is just like asking about the meaning of any event – and thereby
aligns with an everyday use of the term ‘meaning’. Finally, I believe Seachris’ account
can also be modified and expanded to provide an analysis of both ‘(a) meaning’ and
‘meaningfulness’ – which I see as subtly different notions – as well as sets of
requirements which both individual lives and life in general must fulfil if they are to
be appropriately described as having ‘a meaning’ or being ‘meaningful’. Nevertheless,
before I build on this theory further in section 3, it would first be useful to provide
additional context and clarification regarding the general concept of meaning which I
will defend here.
Though this is not always made transparent, the term ‘meaning’ is used both in a
discrete noun form (e.g. a meaning, the meaning, or meanings), identifying some
specific feature of a thing, and in a continuous noun form (simply: meaning), perhaps
identifying the presence or amount of some individual meanings.7 Simply put, I
propose we interpret ‘meaning’ (in its continuous noun form) as being equivalent to
‘sense’. Hence ‘ameaning’ would be equivalent to ‘a sense’ and ‘meanings’ to ‘senses’
etc. On this analysis, when someone asks, ‘What is the meaning of life?’ they are
essentially asking ‘What is the sense of life?’ When someone worries that life is
meaningless, they are essentially worrying that it is senseless. And, as I shall argue
later, when someone desires a life which is meaningful, they are essentially hoping for a
life which is sense-full or full-of-sense.
The identification of meaning and sense is uncontroversial in linguistics. For
instance, consider how a word’s ‘meaning’ is also its ‘sense’ and the synonymous
use of ‘nonsense’ and ‘meaningless’ to describe an incoherent utterance. However, I’m
suggesting that this identity between meaning and sense extends even to discussions
about the existential meaning of life. Several philosophers have noted this possibility
but, to my knowledge, none have explored it in any detail besides Seachris (2009) and
Thomson (2003).8 One motivation for positing this conceptual relationship, which I
have already discussed, is the undeniable similarity between the questions ‘What is the
meaning of life?’ and ‘What is the meaning of this?’, where the latter transparently uses
‘the meaning’ to mean ‘the sense’. Do we have any good reason for thinking that the
existential question does not use ‘meaning’ in the same way? In the final section of this
paper I will consider some rival theories of meaning but, for now, I will set out some
reasons which go a long way towards confirming that ‘meaning’, in existential
contexts, is being used in the same way, and that existential meaning simply is sense.
First of all, if we take a brief survey of the way a few other languages refer to ‘the
meaning of life’, we can see that this lends weighty support to my analysis, given
the concept of ‘sense’ is right at the forefront of each translation of the term
‘meaning’: e.g. ‘el sentido de la vida’ (Spanish), ‘le sens de la vie’ (French), ‘der
Sinn des Lebens’ (German), ‘il senso della vita’ (Italian). If the English term
‘meaning’ had different uses in everyday/linguistic and existential contexts, then
we would expect translations of the latter to reflect that. However, as we can see,
7 As I will demonstrate, the term ‘meaningfulness’ is more closely connected with the continuous noun form,
since it is a measure of the quantity and quality of meaning associated with something.
8 For instance, Audi (2005, p.333), Cottingham (2003, p.22), White (2009, p.425), and Veal (2017, p.251–2).
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sense seems to be the primary translation of existential ‘meaning’, indicating that
the English term can be interpreted as ‘sense’ in both contexts.9
This conceptual connection, if not identity, between existential meaning and sense is
also supported by a host of psychological analyses of meaning in life. For instance,
Markman, Proulx, and Lindberg write that Ball accounts of meaning converge at sense
making^ (2013, p.4).10 As evidence for this, there are various studies which seem to
demonstrate a relationship between existential meaning and our perception that things
in our environment are intelligible or coherent. For instance, one study showed that an
experience of random or senseless patterns lowered participants self-reported percep-
tions that their own lives were meaningful (Heintzelman et al. 2013). Whilst another
showed that participants in conditions designed to make them feel life was less
meaningful (forced to read Kafka etc.) became much more motivated and successful
at an arbitrary pattern recognition test (e.g. Proulx and Heine 2009).11 The offered
explanation for this was that we have a drive to find meaning in the world, especially
when we are confronted with meaninglessness. However, this explanation only works
if there is a conceptual identity or at least close relationship between meaning and
coherence or intelligibility, i.e. sense.
Psychologists working in this area have also provided a great deal of detail as to the
precise nature and function of meaning/sense in our cognitive processes. The basic idea
is that, evolutionarily, our survival depends on our ability to detect patterns and
relationships in our environment and make use of this knowledge to plan our behav-
iour.12 We do this by forming what are called ‘meaning-frameworks’, which are mental
representations or schematics of actual and expected connections between various
things in our world. Proulx and Heine explain:
BThese mental representations encompass anything that one might expect to be
related to anything else—people, places, objects, events—in any way that they
could be construed as related—causally, spatial- temporally, teleologically. When
individuals encounter something, anything, that is not currently related to an
existing framework of relations, it said to be meaningless; it only becomes
meaningful once a relationship, any manner of relationship, is discovered or
imposed." (2006, p.310)
In short, BMeaning frameworks are the complex web of propositions that we hold about
how things are in the world and how things will be^ (George and Park 2016, p.206).
Psychologically speaking, we can understand these meaning-frameworks as being
constituted by sense or meaning (in its continuous noun form) or rather a multitude of
interconnected meanings (in its discrete noun form). Each connection is itself a
9 Another minor piece of linguistic evidence is that the word ‘meaning’ comes from the Old High German
word ‘meinen’, which means ‘to have in mind’, indicating, at the very least, the cognitive roots of the concept
(Martela and Steger 2016, p.537).
10 Further examples include Juhl and Routledge who write that Bmeaning can refer to feelings that the world
outside of the self makes sense^ (2013, p.220) and Stillman and Lambert who report that BBy meaning of
life... people typically intend not a dictionary definition of life – but rather a way to make sense of their
existence^ (2013, p.306). For many more examples see Hicks and Routledge (2013).
11 Importantly, in both studies, positive or negative affect was reported not to have played any role in
producing these effects (Heintzelman and King 2014, p.156).
12 See, for example, George and Park (2016, p.210), and Heintzelman and King (2014, p.155).
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meaning and we can build up these connections or meanings in order to develop a
picture of our world and how it works. For instance, if I piece together that fire causes
smoke, can be caused by lightning, and can be used to cook food, then I have learned
three meanings of fire – three ways the phenomenon of fire can be connected to other
things via, respectively, its effects, origin, and use. I will discuss these sorts of
connections in more detail shortly but, for now, note how natural it is to remark, for
example, fire means smoke, fire means lightning has struck, or fire means we can cook
our dinner. It is also worth noting that meaning-connections such as these are capable of
being more or less robust, depending on the closeness, reliability, and strength of these
relationships, and that these meanings are capable of being identified on a relatively
basic, fundamental level (e.g. lightning strike x caused tree y to burn down) or on a
higher-order level made up of a multitude of interconnected basic meanings (e.g.
lightning strike x caused the collapse of ecosystem z by initiating a devastating forest
fire which spread from tree to tree and killed many animals etc.).
Our overall meaning-framework or sense-framework is what allows us to understand
our world. New events or phenomena will be experienced as intelligible by us to the
extent we are capable of grasping their internal structure (if they are complex) and
connections to the world around them (such as causes and effects), and to the extent this
newly perceived web of meanings can be added to our pre-existing meaning-frame-
work without causing conflicts or inconsistencies. When we ‘make sense’ of something
we observe, we are quite straightforwardly turning our perceptions into sense, by
building new structures into our existing frameworks of meaning/sense. Moreover,
the more meanings of something I grasp and can bring into line with this pre-existing
meaning-framework, the more meaning or sense (in their continuous noun forms) that
phenomenon or event will have for me.
Once this system and drive for comprehending our world was established, it was
only natural that it should be applied to more complex and abstract things as our mental
capacity developed over time (Proulx and Heine 2006, p.311). As Martela and Steger
put it: BBeginning at the discrete level of moment-to-moment experiences… it would
appear that ever more elaborate models of patterns and predictability can be construct-
ed, eventually building to overarching meaning models that help people make sense of
one’s self, the world, and one’s fit within the world^ (2016, p.533). Thus, it is this basic
drive and capacity for detecting and recording patterns and relationships in our
environment which, when directed at the phenomenon of life itself, provokes the
existential question about life’s meaning with which we are now familiar.13 We don’t
just want to know the meanings of events and phenomena in our lives, we want to
know what meanings are held by each of our lives as wholes and by life altogether. In
other words, we want to be able to make sense of these things by finding out how they
connect up to the rest of reality in certain salient ways.
13 Heintzelman et al., for instance, write that BThe oft-noted human need for meaning can be located in
this primal drive for detecting the regularities of existence^ (2013, p.96). Similar accounts can be found
in Proulx and Heine (2006, p.311) and Heine et al. (2006, p.91). If true, this would go some way towards
explaining why a drive for meaning is sometimes characterised as Bthe primary motivation force in man^
(Frankl 1946, p.99). It isn’t merely some shallow, modern predilection; it is fuelled by one of our most
fundamental impulses.
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3 The Meaning of Life (and a Life)
Recall Seachris’ theory that ‘the’meaning of life is the true narrative which answers a list of
various existentially weighty questions. I believe that Seachris’ core insight can be
reconciled with the above psychology-informed analysis of meaning as sense. However,
some amendments need to be made. Summarising much of the above discussion, Martela
and Steger write that, BWhen we ask what something means, we are trying to locate that
somethingwithin ourweb ofmental representations.Meaning is aboutmentally connecting
things. This is true whether we ask about the meaning of a thing or the meaning of our life^
(2016, p.537). We can thus interpret Seacrhis’ list of meaning-questions as targeting an
especially salient assortment of these connections between life and the rest of reality which
have some existential importance to us but are, as of yet, arguably unknown.When we ask
about the meaning of life, we are hoping to make better sense of it by discovering more
about what these particular important meaning-connections are.
Nevertheless, I think Seachris is wrong, first off, to suggest that what counts as ‘the’
meaning of life must be a narrative which narrates across all the above questions. It is
closer to how we naturally use the term, and more in-keeping with my analysis above,
to say that ‘the’ meaning of life could be smaller pieces of this narrative, answering
only a subset (or even just one) of these questions. Assuming, for now, that Seachris
has identified the right questions, we should instead suggest that answers to any of
these questions (i.e. any of these connections between life and reality) could constitute
ameaning of life. Consequently, life will have multiple meanings. Yet, we can stipulate
one or more of them as the meaning of life in different contexts depending on our
concerns. For instance, remembering that to ask about the meaning of life is to make a
request that it be rendered comprehensible to us, the information that is required for this
task will depend on the knowledge we already have and which areas of our ignorance
we care to address. For someone who knows nothing and cares about everything, the
full answer to their request – and hence ‘the’ meaning of life – might well be the entire
narrative. Alternatively, if the only thing I’m confused about is where we came from,
then an explanation of the origin of life alone may be all I need to perceive life as
making sense, and so that is all I need to be provided when I ask about ‘the’meaning of
life. In short, it seems precisely which piece of information/connection(s) counts as the
meaning of life will be relative to different individuals (or groups of individuals with
similar knowledge and concerns).
My second objection to Seachris’ theory is that his list of meaning-questions is not
entirely fitting; iii, iv, and v, for instance, while potentially very significant questions,
do not strike me as the kinds of things we are primarily targeting when we talk about
the meaning of life. The traditional question, it seems to me, would not be appropriately
answered with story about meta-ethics (iii), a theodicy (iv) or a description of the
decomposition of human bodies (v). Neither can some of these questions, in the
complex, nuanced, and multi-part way he has worded them, be given answers in terms
fully reducible to the kinds of basic connections which appear to make up our meaning-
frameworks. Recall that these fundamental meaning-connections were most naturally
identified as, for instance, very straightforward causal or teleological relationships. We
might therefore expect the final meanings of some event to be stateable in terms of
these kinds of basic relationships, whether on an atomic or higher-order level, but the
answers to some of Seachris’ questions cannot be. Moreover, some these questions
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seem to target only limited aspects of life (e.g. suffering, mortality) rather than life
itself. The answers to Seachris’ questions might help us make sense of certain features
of life then, but they don’t all seem fittingly described as meanings-of-life. Granting
that, I would like to repopulate this list of questions with my own slightly more
systematically developed suggestions.14
To be clear, I have argued that the answers to certain questions about life will
naturally strike us as life’s meanings, but that Seachris has mis-identified these ques-
tions. What are the right questions? From the above psychological analysis, it appears
we could identify any of the connections which contribute to our meaning-frameworks
as potential meanings of an event, and hence we should simply look for the sorts of
questions which target those kinds of connections. Nevertheless, some of the connec-
tions suggested (e.g. spatial and temporal) don’t seem naturally labelled as ‘meanings’
of things in ordinary language. In what follows, I aim to highlight a few of the
connections which do carry over to everyday meaning-talk, and the questions which
target them, i.e. the kinds of questions can be answered to intuitively give the meanings
of ordinary events, and hence could be used to indicate life’s potential meanings.
First, to make things more straightforward, we can imagine a simple and non-
agential event, like a bolt of lightning. If someone saw this lightning and asked, ‘What
is the meaning of this?’, it seems to me that there are two things we could reply to her.
Firstly, we could give her an explanation (or narrative) of the causal path which results
in lightning strikes. Secondly, we could tell her the kinds of things that typically result
from lightning strikes, or the specific things which are likely to result from this
lightning strike (e.g. if it will burn the house down or not). This gives us the first
two questions to which the answers might intuitively be the meaning of some event x15:
1. What caused x to happen?
2. What resulted from x?
Next, we can imagine an action rather than event, to see what this adds. For an action,
such as a stranger seating himself in my office, it does seem that either of the first two
questions could be answered to give the action’s meaning, but there is another question
that is perhaps even more salient in this case:
3. What were the Agent’s intentions in doing x?
Here, the agent explaining the purposes or intentions behind their action (e.g. ‘I needed
to meet with you’) again seems like an appropriate response to the question ‘What is
the meaning of this?’ when it is directed at the stranger’s presence.16
The varieties of meaning identified so far are thus constituted by teleological
connections, or forward and backward-looking causal connections. However, the next
meaning-question we can identify does not target a distinct new type of ground-level
meaning-connection, but rather a combination of these first few types of meaning held
14 Although two of my suggestions (1 and 3) will overlap largely with Seachris’ i and ii.
15 Both of these kinds of meanings (along with 3) are what Grice refers to as ‘natural’ meaning (1957, p.378).
16 Thomson, in his discussion of the ‘hermeneutic’meaning of a life, also talks about how an action can have a
meaning in terms of having a purpose (2003, p.140).
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together in one higher-order structure. Specifically, if we imagine an action or event
that takes place on a longer scale with more internal complexity, such as a flurry of
moves in a chess game, and a person asks, ‘What was the meaning of that?’, the reply
they may well get is simply a story of the moves. In other words, a recounting of the
events in the order they happened, but with their most central and revealing causal and
teleological connections highlighted (e.g. ‘Bill moved his king because Andrea had put
him in check, and then…’). This gives us another question that might be added to our
list, primarily for events or sequences of events which are internally complicated and
might defy understanding for that reason.
4. What was x? /What was the story of x?
As noted, strictly speaking, the answer to this question does not constitute a new
ground-level kind of meaning; it asks about the various causal/teleological meanings or
connections within some extended event rather than about some new kind of connec-
tion between that event and other things. Nevertheless, because it can sometimes feel
natural to identify both these external and selected internal connections of an event as
its meanings in ordinary language, it is reasonable and fruitful to proceed as if this
fourth question identifies a fourth distinct kind of meaning. Furthermore, as noted
above, the other external kinds of meaning discussed so far can also sometimes operate
at a higher-order level (e.g. a causal origin meaning built out of many smaller, atomic
meaning-connections), so in some ways the distinction disappears.17
Finally, there is one kind of meaning which can belong to a certain subset of events:
communicative actions. By this I mean things like utterances, writings, and gestures:
anything which one can interpret as intentionally attempting to convey a message. For
these examples, the answer to ‘What is the meaning of x?’ can be whatever assertion,
command, question etc. was being signified.18 This gives us the fifth and final
meaning-question:
5. What does x signify?
There may be some forms of meaning which I have missed – indeed, according to the
psychological analysis of meaning, there will perhaps be many more varieties of basic
connection which contribute to our meaning-frameworks – nevertheless, the ones I
have identified seem to be amongst those most naturally described, in our everyday
language, as the ‘meanings’ which ordinary events can have. For ease, I will label
them, respectively, ‘origin-meaning’, ‘impact-meaning’, ‘purpose-meaning’, ‘narrative-
meaning’, and ‘communicative-meaning’. Simple non-agential events could have the
first two kinds of meaning, while complex, agential, and communicative events could
potentially possess all five kinds of meaning. For instance, take a particular production
of the play Hamlet. If my friend turns to me at the end and asks me ‘What was the
17 The legitimacy of higher-order meanings must be granted in general because, as we shall see, meaningful-
ness only really appears with regard to meanings which are themselves full-of-meaning in this way.
18 This is what Grice would call ‘nonnatural’ meaning (1957, p.378). Thomson’s own hermeneutic theory
focuses on this kind of meaning. For instance, he claims that BKnowing the meanings of one’s life can be
understood as knowing how to interpret it as one would a text^ (2003, p.150). I think this strays too far from
our usual concerns about the meaning of life, however, as I explain below.
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meaning of that?’ There are (at least) five sorts of answers I could appropriately give
him, and which one is most fitting will depend on which of the above questions was
most salient to him at the time of asking.
Most likely he could have been asking me for the moral or message of the play, i.e.
its communicative-meaning.19 This answer would thus be the meaning of the play that
my friend was seeking. Alternatively, he could be expressing some confusion as to the
actual plot of the play. In this case, the meaning of the play he is requesting is a
recounting of its story, i.e. it’s narrative-meaning. The other three interpretations are
likely to be less salient for this situation, but can still be brought forth. For instance
(taking the play as a single action, perhaps belonging to the director), let’s say the
director is known for outlandish experimental theatre, and that my friend is confused as
to why he chose to put on such a mediocre and by-the-books version of Hamlet. In this
case, my friend’s request for the meaning of the play could be interpreted as a request
for the purpose-meaning of the action: ‘Why did the director choose to do this?’ We
could also interpret his question as asking for the impact-meaning of this action: ‘What
will this do to the director’s career now?’ Or finally even as a request for the causes that
produced the action, i.e. its origin-meaning: ‘What on earth led to this?’
To reiterate, when a person asks, ‘What is the meaning of this?’, according to my
analysis, they are expressing that they don’t understand some aspect of the thing in
question, and they are requesting that it be made intelligible to them. Specifically, what
they want is the sense of the event (which they are referring to as its ‘meaning’) and
there at least five different kinds of answers we could provide. Which of these five
answers or ‘meanings’ should be offered as the meaning of the event, will then depend
on the concerns of the person asking the question, and which sub-question was most
salient at the time of asking.
Nevertheless, it stands to reason that different individuals might offer different
answers here, even to the same sub-question. This is because we can each perceive
different meanings in the same thing depending on various factors, such as: what kind
of information we have access to, our background beliefs, and our facility for reasoning
and deduction. Indeed, these factors can have such an effect that different individuals
may see the same event as having wildly contrasting meanings, or even perceive it as
being entirely without meaning, while others see its meaning as obvious and unam-
biguous. For instance, when I reflect on lightning, this phenomenon will have an
origin-meaning for me if I am aware of some minimally comprehensible causal
explanation for it, and the content of this particular origin-meaning will depend on
what I’ve observed, learned, or been told about lightning, say, that it is the result of
electrically charged particles.20 Alternatively, if I come across someone who believes
that lightning is caused by the god Thor,21 then for that person, lightning will have a
very different origin-meaning.
19 In this case the communicative-meaning would not be directly signified by the play, but still contained
within it, as a fable can be said to contain a message or lesson to be learnt.
20 If I’ve heard nothing about the origins of lightning, or only heard explanations which are, to me,
unintelligible, then I won’t perceive it as having any origin-meaning. Rather, it will seem to be a random
and ‘meaningless’ occurrence. This intelligibility requirement follows naturally from the fact that gaining an
understanding of some thing is precisely what meanings are for, so an alleged meaning which remains
unintelligible to me will fail to count as a meaning at all.
21 Thank you to an anonymous reviewer for this nice example.
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What meanings something has will thus be relative to certain individuals, or rather
certain groups of individuals who share the same mindset and beliefs about the world.
That said, when we come across a conflict between meanings, we can do more than
simply agree to disagree, as we might in a mere difference of taste. First of all, we could
point out that the meaning a person perceives in something might be based on beliefs
which are incorrect. We could also point out that someone’s perceived meaning was
based on biases, mistakes in reasoning, or other faulty thought-processes. If our
interlocutors are not responsive to these observations, however, then there isn’t much
more we can do; it would remain true that for them (and others with the same
perspective and beliefs), that event/phenomenon has that meaning.
Nevertheless, I take it that many of us do care whether the meanings we perceive in
the world and in our lives are based on faulty assumptions or mistaken inferences. As
evidence, being reliably informed that we have erred in some way can often cause us to
update our perception of the meaning of some event or whether it even has a meaning
in that regard. Granting this, there are certain perspectives which we may hope our own
perspectives on meaning align with – perspectives which are, for instance, free from
our own personal unjustified biases, knowledge-gaps, and other cognitive faults. For
instance, we may hope that the meaning we perceive in something is the samemeaning
that would be perceived by a properly informed and clear-thinking human being.
Although the perceptions of meaning linked to such a perspective would not constitute
anything like ‘objective meaning’,22 they would at least give us something to aim for in
our debates about, and interest in, the ‘genuine’ meanings of things.
Now we know what it is for an event or phenomenon to have a meaning (for a
particular person), and five kinds of meaning they can have, we can apply this
analysis to life, both individually and collectively understood. It is possible to
interpret both a life and all life as internally complex events, which would give
us origin, impact, and narrative-meaning, but it is also possible to interpret them as
actions, either taken by some creator being in their choice to generate the life, or as
the conglomerate action of all living humans/a single human across their lifetime.
This would give us both purpose-meaning and communicative-meaning but each
would be split into two parts, given there are now two sets of intentions that might
be relevant in each case. For instance, God could have intended to do or commu-
nicate a particular thing by creating us, but we could also intend to do or commu-
nicate something very different with our existence.
Nevertheless, I will not bring this last communicative sort of meaning into my
conceptions primarily because it strikes me that this kind of meaning, unlike the others,
is simply not the sort of meaning which is usually at stake when we think about the
meaning of life; it might be possible for our lives to have a meaning like this, but that is
not what we are concerned with when in the midst of an existential crisis; and the claim
that x’s life had a meaning would never normally be interpreted as the claim that x’s life
was itself a kind of message.
Granting all this, the question ‘What is the meaning of all human life?’ could
potentially receive five kinds of appropriate answer, depending on which non-
22 In fact, ‘objective meaning’ would be an incoherent concept to the extent the qualifier ‘objective’ identifies
something which exists entirely independently of any particular perspective, while perceptions of meaning are
necessarily linked to the perspective of some (at least hypothetical) being reflecting on their world.
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understood aspects of life were most salient to the asker (see Table 1). It will then have
a meaning (or meanings) if the relevant questions are amenable to intelligible answers,
and lack meanings if they are not.
The table above lays out the variety of interpretations the traditional meaning
question could receive. Nevertheless, as I see it, there are a few questions that usually
seem closer to the surface in the traditional question: 1, 3a, and perhaps 2. Alternatively,
the questions which typically seem least salient would be 3b and 4, the former because
we don’t typically imagine that humanity is collectively committed to some shared
purpose, and the latter presumably because we already know what sort of things go on
within life, for the most part.
The equivalent table for the meanings of individual lives (Table 2) looks similar, and
again I believe the forms of meaning which we are typically most concerned with are 1, 2
and 3a. However, particularly with regard to our own lives, we may also be more interested
in the other two forms of meaning as well: 3b, because the likelihood of there being a single
identifiable purpose is much higher when we’re talking about just one person, rather than all
humanity, and so it makes more sense to ask the question; and 4, because the more detailed
stories of individual lives are of particular pragmatic and emotional interest to us.
I have now provided a characterisation of the concept of meaning in general and
accounts of what it takes for a life, and all life, to have such a meaning or meanings.
Meaning is sense, and thus the meanings of (a) life, if it has them, are its senses – the
intelligible answers to certain salient questions we have which would allow us to better
understand (the) life. That said, what one should offer as an answer to questions about
the meaning of (a) life is determined by the specific concerns of the asker, and whether
(a) life is ultimately perceived to have various meanings or not will be relative to
different people and is determined by their knowledge, beliefs, and cognitive capacities.
Granting the above, we now know, in these discussions, what meaning means, and
we also know what it takes for a life, and all life, to at least be perceived by us as having
a meaning. In the next section, I will use this analysis to outline an accompanying
characterisation of meaningfulness and an account of which variables determine the
meaningfulness of an individual’s life.
4 Meaningfulness as Sensefulness
One might assume that ‘having a meaning’ and ‘being meaningful’ would describe
lives in the same states. This is understandable given how close the terms seem to be,
Table 1 Interpretations of the question ‘What is the meaning of all human life?’
Salient form of meaning/sense Accompanying question
1. Origin What caused us to exist?
2. Impact What will our existence result in?
3a. Purpose (creator’s) Why where we created?
3b. Purpose (humanity’s own) What aim are we collectively most committed to?
4. Narrative What is life/ What happens within life?
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but it is wrong. Although it may be true that a life cannot be meaningful without having
a meaning and cannot be entirely meaningless if it has a meaning, the two concepts are
not identical. The most obvious difference between the two is that, intuitively, having a
meaning seems to be a binary concept – a meaning is something your life either has or
lacks (in each respect 1–4) –whereas the meaningfulness of a life appears to be a matter
of degree. For instance, a life can be a little bit meaningful or verymeaningful, and one
life can be more meaningful than another.23 Thus, there could be two lives which both
have a meaning, but which have different levels of meaningfulness. As an example,
imagine a heart surgeon alongside someone who devotes their life to looking after their
pet cat. Intuitively we may feel that both individuals have a meaning in their lives, but
the heart surgeon lives a far more meaningful life in the end. It’s clear that meaning-
having and meaningfulness are not identical then.
One way of understanding this according to my earlier analysis might be to suggest
that people can have a meaning in their lives simply if they have a meaning in any one
of the five senses proposed, but to have a meaningful life, they must possess all five
kinds of meaning. This is not what I mean to say. Instead, I think meaning-having and
meaningfulness can be separated even within one category of meaning. For instance, in
terms of the impact-meaning of the heart surgeon and cat-owner above; both individ-
uals produce some concrete effect on the world, and so both individuals have an
impact-meaning, but the heart surgeon’s life seems to be more meaningful, even limited
to just this respect. In fact, we might say the impact-meaning of the surgeon’s life is
itself a more meaningful meaning than the cat-owner’s impact-meaning.
How can we explain this? What makes a meaning of an event or life more or less
meaningful itself? Fortunately, we already have all the tools we need to answer this
question; if the meaning of an event is simply its ‘sense’, then the meaningfulness of
that information/meaning is simply its ‘sensefulness’ or how ‘full-of-sense’ it is.
Naturally, an answer to one of the meaning-questions will be more senseful the more
intelligible it is; however, by ‘sensefulness’ I mean to measure not just the degree to
which the content of a particular meaning is intelligible but also the richness of that
content. In psychological terms, ‘meaningfulness’ measures not just intelligibility but
also the robustness and amount of individual meaning-connections associated with
something or concentrated in some area of our meaning-framework. This means there
is both a qualitative and quantitative aspect to sensefulness; even if an answer is totally
intelligible, if it has very little or very weakly-connected content, it will be perceived as
23 E.g. Metz (2013, p.6).
Table 2 Interpretations of the question ‘What is the meaning of x’s life?’
Salient form of meaning/sense Accompanying question
1. Origin What caused x to exist?
2. Impact What did x’s existence result in?
3a. Purpose (creator’s) Why was x created?
3b. Purpose (individual’s own) What aim was x most committed to?
4. Narrative What happened in x’s life?
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less full-of-sense overall than an answer which is equally intelligible but involves a
great deal more content or more robustly-connected content. Both answers will make
sense to us in that we can comprehend them equally well, but the latter will have more
sense in it – it will be more senseful – given the material there for us to comprehend is
richer. To make an analogy, a single sentence and an entire book can be equally
comprehensible, and thus both will have an equal quality of sense, but the book will
have a larger quantity of sense (i.e. it will be more full-of-sense and meaning-full) than
the sentence, given there are more ideas/claims/descriptions etc. in the book for us to
make sense of.
Having outlined my proposal that the meaningfulness of something can be
interpreted as it’s sensefulness – i.e. the richness (robustness and quantity) of its
content, multiplied by how intelligible that content is – we can now outline some of
the ways any event can be meaningful, corresponding to some of the ways any event
can have a meaning24:
1. Origin-meaning: ‘What caused x to happen?’ The sensefulness or meaningfulness
of the answer to this question will be a measure of how many entities, forces,
events etc. conspired to produce x, multiplied by the comprehensibility and
strength of this causal web. Like other meanings, the origin-meaning of a thing
can operate on a higher-order level, being built out of a multitude of smaller
interconnected meanings, and the more of these meanings there are, and the more
robust they are, (assuming they can all be grasped and coherently connected to our
wider meaning-framework), the more meaningful/senseful that origin-meaning will
be. Thus, an event which was the culmination of centuries of planning and work by
thousands of different people and organisations is going to be more meaningful
than an event which was merely caused by the passing whim of an individual
person, or a gust of wind. This evaluation strikes me as intuitively plausible and
hence the example supports my proposed concept of meaningfulness; although the
explanations of each event are equally intelligible, the explanation of the former
event will be simply richer and more brimming with meaning-connections than the
latter explanation, which means it will be more full-of-sense.
2. Impact-meaning: ‘What resulted from x?’ The sensefulness or meaningfulness of
answers to this question are determined in essentially the same way as the first but
mirrored so as to look into the future following the event, rather than the past
leading up to it. An event will be more senseful in this respect to the extent the
answer to the above question is both intelligible and rich in terms of touching many
people, places, things etc. and affecting them in a powerful rather than weak way;
i.e. if the impact-meaning itself involves more (and more robust) internal meaning-
connections. Again, I think this sits perfectly with our intuitions. A cure for cancer
would have a more meaningful effect on the world than a cure for some less
pervasive disease, since the effects of the former go further and involve more
people and to a greater degree.
3. Purpose-meaning: ‘Why was x performed?’ The answer to this question – this kind
of meaning – was an account of the intentions of the agent who chose or carried out
24 Here I ignore the communicative variety of meaningfulness again, as it remains irrelevant to my ultimate
concern of (a) life’s meaningfulness.
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the action, provided those intentions were minimally coherent; if the agent’s
intentions were nonsense, however, then we would say their action had no
meaning. Nevertheless, as above, the sensefulness of an action is determined by
additional variables: not just the degree to which the intended purpose is coherent
(e.g. logically or practically achievable), but also the complexity of the individual’s
plan and the strength or deliberateness of their intentions (i.e. the robustness of the
relevant meaning-connections). The sensefulness or meaningfulness of an activity
in this form is thus a measure of the intricacy or scope of the activity and the extent
to which the purposes motivating it were both intelligible and strongly-held.
Accordingly, someone who wholeheartedly devoted his day to building a boat will
have been acting more meaningfully, or with more sense to his actions, than
someone who half-heartedly did the same, or someone who wholeheartedly spent
their day trying to draw a square circle.
4. Narrative-meaning: ‘What was the story of x?’ Once again, the meaning of an
event or sequence of events, in this sense, is the minimally comprehensible story
that can be told of them. However, this story will be more meaningful the richer it
gets – involving more characters, projects, achievements – and the more intelligible
its connections and plotlines. The problem here – which also exists for the other
varieties of meaningfulness, to some extent – is that the complexity or richness of
the story and its intelligibility cannot both be maximised at the same time, since the
more content or meaning-connections that fill a story, the harder it will be for us to
comprehend. Thus, the ideally meaningful life, in this sense, will be a life that
involves a healthy and varied amount of content and yet has a plot which is stable
and coherent enough for us to follow.25 Once more this chimes with our intuitions;
both someone who lives an essentially empty life with no friends or projects, and
someone who lives a chaotically and incomprehensibly busy life, seem to have less
meaningful life-stories than a person whose life is rich and intelligible, perhaps
following a familiar pattern of long-term efforts overcoming obstacles and leading
to lasting success.
Returning to the analysis of the last section, we can identify five aspects of (a) life which
can be assessed for their meaningfulness, corresponding to the five kinds of meaning it
could have: its 1. Origin, 2. Impact, 3a. Purpose (our creator’s), 3b. Purpose (our own),
and 4. Narrative. This means that, an individual’s life, for instance, will have high levels
of meaningfulness if it was the product of the confluence of several identifiable forces
and entities (1), which worked over centuries to deliberately create them for some
comprehensible purpose (3a), and if it involved a rich and intelligible life-story (4) of
passionate and coherent pursuits (3b) and led to massively significant impacts (2).
Whilst an individual’s life will have the lowest levels of meaningfulness when it was
a product of a single random and non-agential cause, and they led an empty or utterly
confusing life-story and died leaving no trace of them ever having existed.
Similar archetypically meaningful and meaningless forms can be applied to human
life itself; i.e. life would be more meaningful if we existed for a reason, and left a big
25 On a similar note, Kauppinen also points out the problems for meaningfulness that are caused by having too
much or not enough variety in one’s life, and ultimately suggests an ideally meaningful life-story would
involve a variety of activities coherently linked together (2012, p.365–8).
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impact on the universe, and so on. However, I think we should resist the temptation to
aggregate all the forms of meaningfulness into one overall score like this because
meaningfulness does not necessarily function that way; in a similar way to meaning, the
aspects of (a) life which determine its overall meaningfulness will be a relational fact,
depending again on the concerns of the person performing the assessment. For some-
one who cares only about significance, a person with a perfect life story, who
nevertheless leaves no trace, will have a meaningless life overall. On the other hand,
for a person who cares most about why we are here, a life will seem fairly meaningful if
God deliberately created it, no matter how aimless or empty it ultimately turned out to
be. In all cases though, when (a) life seems meaningful, it will be because it had a
meaning or meanings which struck us as rich and comprehensible, and where (a) life
seems meaningless it will either be because the meanings we were concerned about
were relatively empty of content, or the content those meanings did have was weak or
incoherent (i.e. they lacked sense in terms of quality).
5 Advantages of the Sense/Sensefulness Account
Having laid out my full analysis of meaning and meaningfulness, it is now time to
outline the strengths of my account and the ways in which it compares favourably to
competing theories in the literature. First of all, it is a more comprehensive account
than most provided so far. As noted, most theorists simply address themselves to
answering either the question ‘What makes a life meaningful’ or, less commonly,
‘What is the meaning of life?’, but neglect to broaden their accounts or try to
indicate how the two topics could be related. On the other hand, my account
provides characterisations of both meaningfulness and meaning which fit together
and give way to sets of relatively concrete application conditions for each. Further-
more, as Kauppinen has pointed out (2012, p.352), the vast majority of existing
theories merely lay out the criteria or requirements for a life to count as meaningful,
without saying anything about what meaningfulness actually means, as I have done.
In other words, they provide conceptions of meaningfulness but say nothing about
the concept they are providing conceptions of.26
Moreover, my identification of ‘meaning’ with ‘sense’ aligns with a natural every-
day use of the term ‘meaning’. This is particularly clear when we note the similarities
between the questions ‘What is the meaning of life?’ and ‘What is the meaning of
this?’, the latter of which transparently takes ‘meaning’ to mean ‘sense’. My account
also enjoys a great deal of support from psychological theory and experimental studies,
and from the many translations of the phrase ‘meaning of life’, which demonstrate the
centrality of ‘sense’ in the concept. Additionally, my theory chimes with our intuitions
about when a life will have or lack a particular meaning and what kind of answers
might be appropriate to the question ‘What is the meaning of X?’ As I have shown in
section 3, the meanings of a life are the answers to various kinds of question that might
be asked in order to better make sense of it. If a life is not perceived as having an
26 Kauppinen (2012), Metz (2013), and Martela (2017) make this distinction using these terms and, notably,
each say something about the concept of meaningfulness their theory employs. Fischer (2005, 2009) also
attempts to do this, although he does not use the language of concepts and conceptions.
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intelligible cause, effect, purpose, or story, then we will naturally say it has no meaning
in these senses. Yet, if it does have these things, then giving any one of them can
sometimes be an appropriate response to the question at hand. In other words, if asked
for the meaning of X’s life, depending on the context, it could be entirely fitting to reply
either with information about where X came from, what X’s life led to, what purpose X
was chiefly involved in pursuing, or what the story of X’s life was.
The fact that several sorts of answers can legitimately be seen as a type of meaning,
and consequently, several variables can be seen as determining the meaningfulness of a
life, also stands as an advantage over most of the existing theories of meaningfulness
proposed in the literature. For instance, ‘consequentialist’ theories, such as those of
Smuts (2013) or Bramble (2015), suggest that a life will be meaningful to the extent
that it produces value or makes the world a better place. If I am right, then these theories
will have successfully identified something close to one key factor relevant to the
meaningfulness of a life – its impact – but such theories neglect all other relevant
factors, to their detriment. For instance, we can see that the short life of someone with
unique DNA unwillingly tortured for medical data must be lacking in at least some
kinds of meaningfulness, no matter how significant and valuable the results were.
In line with such observations, Purves and Delon (2018) have noted that such
consequentialist theories are implausible because they fail to take into account whether
the individual’s life involved any intentional actions or deliberate work. Here, it seems
that they have correctly identified the bearing of purpose to the meaningfulness of a
life. Yet, Purves and Delon, along with theorists such as Luper (2014), Bradford (2015),
and Levy (2005), whose theories also champion the relevance of purposeful action or
pursuit of one’s goals, are also too narrow. They perhaps indicate when a life is likely to
have both the purpose (3b) and impact (2) varieties of meaningfulness, but they
themselves neglect other varieties of meaningfulness such as narrative (4) or origin-
meaning (1). Many other accounts also fall into this category of theories which appear
to involve both valuable effects and some kind of intentional effort towards them, such
as Nozick’s (2001) ‘connecting to or promoting organic unity’, or Metz’ (2013)
‘directing one’s rationality toward the fundamental conditions of human existence’.
However, they too fall foul of being overly narrow, and neglecting other variables
which also matter.
Narrativist theories are typically the most promising, such as those of Fischer (2005,
2009) and Kauppinen (2012), as they appear to incorporate some measure of the
coherence or comprehensibility of the individual’s life-story as well as elements of
purposefulness and significance (with these elements made explicitly clear in
Kauppinen’s theory in particular). Nevertheless, even these theories neglect to acknowl-
edge that having been created with a purpose in mind (instead of merely adopting one)
or having an intelligible causal explanation for our lives can also be relevant in
determining their meaningfulness. Moreover, Fischer and Kauppinen each characterise
the concept or meaning of meaningfulness itself in ways that appear less plausible than
my own proposal. Fischer, for instance, identifies meaningfulness as Bthe value of
artistic creativity or self-expression^ (2005, p.379), while Kauppinen characterises it as
condition of a life for which pride, admiration, or fulfilment would be fitting (2012,
p.353). Yet, neither of these concepts align with anything like an everyday use of the
term ‘meaningful’. Furthermore, neither of these concepts align very well with our
intuitions about what existential meaningfulness is; a person who complained that their
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life involved no self-expression and would be inappropriate as an object of admiration
or fulfilment might also have had a meaningless existence, but this appears to be saying
something different or over-and-above the admission that they’ve merely lived
uncreatively and wasted their time.
On the other hand, as noted, my own interpretation of meaningfulness as
‘sensefulness’ does have some connection to our everyday language and succeeds in
aligning with our strongest intuitions about when (a) life will be meaningful (and
meaningless), to what degree, and for what reasons. For instance, a life does indeed
seem more meaningful to the extent it has a substantial and coherent impact on the
world. Moreover, while I previously asserted that the unwilling subject of medical
experiments would not seem to have an ideally meaningful life, regardless of how
significant the results were, this is not a problem for my theory granting, as it does, that
impact is just one of several types of meaningfulness we can be concerned with, and the
individual in question will presumably have a weak life-story (4) and be lacking in
strong commitment to any aim (3b).27 A person’s life will also typically strike us as
more meaningful the more richly coherent their life-story is, and the more richly
intelligible their origins and purposes are.
Additionally, my account can explain why the ‘death of god’ led to feelings of
meaninglessness for many28: absent God’s intentions in creating us, life lost its assigned
purpose and hence one of its varieties of meaning and meaningfulness (3a).29 Similarly,
my account can clarify precisely what was going on in John Stuart Mill’s worry that
achieving his life’s goals would actually constitute a crisis of meaning for him,30 since
he would be trading added impact (2) for a loss of purpose in life (3b), and an emptier
life-story (4). Moreover, it also explains why our existence seems less meaningful when
we chalk it up to random chance, but more meaningful when we cast it as the pinnacle of
millions of years of evolution, since this explanation of our origin strikes us as richer and
more coherent (1). Finally, only by conceiving of meaningfulness as sensefulness can
we explain why absurdity – incoherence, irrationality, or nonsense (Feinberg 1992,
p.156) – is treated by so many as connected to meaninglessness31 which other theorists,
who understand meaningfulness differently, are forced to deny.32
What about subjectivist or hybrid theories of meaningfulness though? These are
accounts which hold that, in order for a person’s life to be truly meaningful, they must
also possess the right sort of positive attitude or appraisal of their life. For instance,
simple subjectivist accounts, such as Richard Taylor’s fulfilment theory (1970) and
Harry Frankfurt’s loving/caring theory (1988) typically hold that an activity causing a
certain attitude or feeling in the individual (e.g. fulfilment or love) is both necessary and
sufficient to render it meaningful. More advanced subjectivist accounts hold that we are
27 Of course, if they deliberately volunteered for the experiments these claims would be less true, but then I
think the life would accordingly seem that much more meaningful.
28 For instance, Baggini writes: BAll would agree that the ‘discovery’ that there is no God has created a crisis
of meaning for human life^ (2005, p.10).
29 Landau (1997, p.265) makes something like this point. Similarly, George and Park point out that religious
belief could allow one to give additional (purpose) meaning to periods of trauma and suffering within life,
which the non-religious might not have access to (2016, p.207).
30 Mill wrote about this crisis in his (1924) autobiography and it is often discussed in the literature, e.g.
Bradford (2015) and Levy (2005).
31 For instance, Camus (1942) and Nagel (1971).
32 For instance, Metz (2013, p.6) and Brill (2007, p.6).
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living meaningfully if and only if we are engaged in activities which we value or take
ourselves, in our best judgement, to have good reason to value (e.g. Calhoun 2018).33
Alternatively, hybrid theories suggest that this sort of subjective appreciation or
valuation is not sufficient for meaningfulness, but is still necessary. For instance, Wolf
has proposed that meaningfulness is generated when a life involves both the production
of objective value and subjective fulfilment (2010), and Evers and van Smeden argue
the same but substitute a notion of ‘valuation’ for fulfilment (2016).
If subjective fulfilment or mere positive valuation of one’s life were always sufficient
for meaningfulness, then my own account will be mistaken. Nevertheless, granting
such a premise leads to some unacceptable false-positives. For instance, in the case of
the simple subjectivist conceptions, it seems that we could end up with a meaningful
life simply by plugging ourselves into an experience machine (Nozick 1974, p.42), or
taking a special pill (Brogaard and Smith 2005, p445) and most, I presume, would
reject these suggestions as absurd.34 The more advanced subjectivist theories – which
require us to actually engage with projects which we value – avoid the above problems,
but still seem vulnerable to the objection that one could live a meaningful life by
watching paint dry, provided one had come to value this activity in the right way.
Theorists here sometimes note that it would be incredibly unlikely for any psycholog-
ically normal human to sincerely value this sort of thing35 – but to the extent it is
theoretically conceivable, it remains a fairly damning problem.
Finding value or fulfilment in one’s activities cannot be sufficient for a meaningful
life then, but could it be a necessary condition? This requirement seems more plausible.
It would also be relatively easy to incorporate it into my own account. Specifically,
instead of claiming that a life will be meaningful (in various ways), to the extent we
perceive it as having some rich and intelligible origin, impact, purpose, or story, I
would also have to stipulate that one’s life will count as meaningful only when it has
such features and they are positively appraised in some regard. For example, it would
not be enough to merely produce some large impact on the world, that impact would
have to be seen as positive in order to confer any meaningfulness on one’s life.
One reason for supporting such a value-condition is that many people take mean-
ingfulness to be closely connected to whether life is worthwhile.36 The descriptor
‘meaningful’ is commonly applied to things seemingly in virtue of their worth,
especially in reference to a person’s life, where ‘meaningfulness’ is often taken
explicitly to denote a kind of final value – a quality of life which it is necessarily good
for the individual to possess.37 Indeed, it is true that a meaningful life, even understood
33 A third potential variety of subjectivist theory might say that a person’s life is meaningful if and only if they
themselves feel a sense of meaningfulness in regard to it. If we interpret this feeling of meaningfulness as a
feeling associated with the perception of sense (as Heintzelman and King suggest [2014, p.163]), then this
theory will not be far from my own account. Nevertheless, even if a person experiences their own life as
meaningful, others might not judge it the same way (e.g. if they find it unintelligible), so we might prefer to
qualify that a person’s life will be meaningful for them, to the extent they experience this feeling.
34 Moreover, psychological work has demonstrated that feelings of Bmeaning in life can exist in the absence of
positive affect^ and vice versa (Heintzelman and King 2014, p.163).
35 E.g. Calhoun (2018, p.41–2), Arpaly (2010, p.87), and Kekes (1986, p.85–86).
36 Camus (1942), for instance, famously wrote that the meaning of life was the most important philosophical
question because it determined whether or not life was worth living.
37 For instance, Metz (2013, p.4), Wolf (2010, p.8), and Smuts (2013, p.538). See Thomas (2018) for a
critique of this assumption.
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value-neutrally, is something that almost all of us will want. We want our existence to
be richly comprehensible; we want a life with a graspable life-story, and with origins,
aims, and effects that make sense to us. Yet, the admission that a meaningful life will
often be good for us does not entail the content of a life’s meanings must themselves be
seen as positive or valuable; meaningfulness can be an object of desire even if it is
merely a value-neutral measure of richness and comprehensibility.
The assumption that a life can only be meaningful through involvement in
positively-valued features is not outlandish, however. For instance, there will typically
be a large overlap between lives which we perceive as worthwhile or valuable, and
lives which fulfil my various value-neutral conditions for meaningfulness: e.g. lives
successfully devoted to some noble cause will also possess a high degree of purpose
and impact-meaningfulness. Moreover, it would be difficult for us to evaluate a life
positively without it being basically comprehensible (Martela and Steger 2016, p.538).
Thus, the presence of some kind of positive value is often sufficient for meaningfulness
even on my account, and meaningfulness (or basic intelligibility at least) may be
necessary for some kind of positive valuation. Given this, it would not be surprising
to discover the two concepts had become entangled, leaving people with the impression
that value or worthiness was a necessary aspect of meaningfulness itself. Nevertheless,
I reject this suggestion: events and lives can be meaningful without being worthy or
producing positive value. Indeed, when we think of meaningful events, the examples
which first come to mind are often those with incredibly negative value, such as WWII
or 9/11 (Bradford 2015, p.5).
The absence of any value condition in my account might be objected to on a couple
of grounds. First, one might argue that it entails two people with outwardly identical
lives will have identical levels of meaningfulness even if one loved their time on Earth
while the other found their life miserable and worthless. This is not so: to the extent
meaningfulness requires the various features of a person’s life to be comprehensible,
the latter person will have a less meaningful life, granting that it makes less sense to
lead a life one finds no worth in. My theory does imply that such a miserable person
could have a somewhat meaningful life, but that strikes me as entirely appropriate.
Contra hybrid theorists like Wolf, someone like Martin Luther King would still seem to
have a substantially meaningful life, even if he saw no value in his work but was rather
motivated by mere compulsion.
Another consequence of value-neutral theories like my own is that they entail
individuals like Hitler could have had meaningful lives, which is unpalatable for
many.38 Nevertheless, some theorists have bitten this bullet and argued that Hitler’s
life really was meaningful,39 and I am willing to bite this bullet too. Hitler’s life
certainly had several high levels of meaningfulness in virtue of his dedication to his
purpose (3b), the generally rich and coherent story of his life as he overcame obstacles
in his rise to power (4), and in the massive impact he had on the entire world (2).40
Nevertheless, I think we can stomach this conclusion if we remind ourselves that
38 For instance, Martela (2017, p.252) and Kauppinen (2012, p.361, footnote 31) both specifically deny that
Hitler could have lived a meaningful life, and others such as Bramble (2015), Smuts (2012), and Wolf (2010)
would all likely say the same, given that their theories each involve an explicit objective value requirement.
39 For instance, Kekes (2000, p.30), Baggini (2005, p.175), and Wong (2008, p.142)
40 That said, there is certainly room to criticise the coherence of certain aspects of his life, such as his overall
aims, and this would negatively affect the meaningfulness of his life.
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evaluating a life as meaningful is not necessarily to praise it, at least, not according to
my analysis. Thus, while Hitler’s life was hugely evil in many ways, it would be wrong
to deny it was meaningful, just as it would be wrong to deny, for instance, that he was a
famous figure; like meaningfulness, this is not inherently a form of commendation.41
Moreover, while we might all desire a meaningful life, getting a meaningful life is not
the only thing that matters to us. Specifically, what we presumably desire is for our
lives to be meaningful and good, or perhaps meaningful for the right reasons.
I have rejected the need to introduce a value-requirement into my theory as either a
sufficient or necessary condition for meaningfulness tout court. Nevertheless, there is
perhaps a weaker way value could be incorporated: I could simply add value-meaning
as another kind of meaning alongside origin-meaning, impact-meaning etc. Some-
thing’s value-meaning would constitute the answer to the question: ‘What is valuable
about it?’ and a life or event would be more value-meaningful the more valuable it was.
Positive evaluation would be both necessary and sufficient for value-meaning then, but
the other kinds of meaning would remain value-neutral. Whether this final adjustment
would please the subjectivists/hybridists will depend on their motivations for thinking
value is relevant: for instance, it would not allow us to deny Hitler’s life was mean-
ingful in any way, but it would allow us to point to one way a valuable/worthwhile life
is, ceteris paribus, more meaningful than a worthless one. In the end, I do not believe
that my theory needs value-meaning to be complete, but it is certainly capable of
accepting this addition if it constitutes an improvement.
To conclude, I have presented and defended a complete and unified theory of meaning
and meaningfulness, which resonates with our strongest and most plausible intuitions
about what variables are relevant to meaning in life and what this topic is really about.
This analysis has strong linguistic, philosophical, and psychological support, and suc-
ceeds in simultaneously incorporating the insights of the best existing theories whilst
avoiding the problems inherent in those overly narrow accounts. Granting all I have
argued, we have several very good reasons to believe that, when we say wewant our lives
to have a meaning, what we are really saying is that we want them to have an intelligible
origin, impact, purpose, or story, and when we say we want them to be meaningful, what
we are really saying is that we want them to be both rich and intelligible in one or more of
these respects – in other words, we want them to be full of sense.
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